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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL EWAN, 
Plaintiff- .,1 p pe llant, 
vs. 
RAY BUTTERS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
10086 
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Ray VanCott, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and property 
damage arising out of a collision between the plaintiff 
who was a pedestrian and the defendant who was driving 
his automobile. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried with a jury. At the close of the 
first day of trial, it was agreed what the testimony would 
be from OTIJe additional witness. Thereupon, the Court 
granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and from which 
the plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks reversal of the Dismissal, and that 
the case be remanded for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Carol Ewan, is employed by West Coast 
Air Lines as a passenger agent (T. 25, L. 17-19) and has 
been for approximately five years (T. 26, L. 15), and prior 
to January, 1964, had lived in Salt Lake a little over 31h 
years (T. 26, L. 24). She is divorced (T. 27, L. 23), and has a 
15 year old son (T. 27, L. 10), and in order to support her 
son she had a part time job after her working hours, em-
ployed by the Relaxercizor Company (T. 27, L. 26). It was 
the plaintiff's practice that when a person made inquiry 
about a Relaxercizor that the plaintiff would call them on 
the telephone, make an appointment if the inquiring per· 
son wanted to see the machine, and would go and dem-
onstrate it to them (T. 28, L. 26-30). On the evening of 
November 21, 1962, the plaintiff had an appointment with 
a Mrs. Trudy Turn:er who lived on Duluth Street in Salt 
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Lake City (T. 29, L. 6 & 7). The plaintiff did not know 
"·here Duluth was and Mrs. Turner gave her directions to 
take Second West to Beck Street (T. 29, L. 8). As a matter 
of fact, Second West ends at a curve and the continuation 
of the same street becomes known as Beck Street. This, 
hn\vever, was unknown to the plaintiff (T. 29, L. 9-11). The 
plaintiff left her home at approximately 6:30 or 6:45 (T. 
2n, L. 23) to keep this appointment, and drove north on 
Second West Street (T. 30, L. 4-7). As she proceeded north 
nn Second West Street she saw a sign across the street on 
the west hand side reading Beck Street (T. 30, L. 9-11), 
which was slightly turned, and plaintiff mistakenly 
thought that Beck Street went to the west off Second West. 
She proceeded on north past the Mars Service Station 
which is located on the east side of Second West or Beck 
Street, turned around and came back and turned at the 
sign she had seen, or to the west, into what she thought 
was Beck Street and found it was not a street at all and 
her automobile became stuck in the mud (T. 30, L. 15-30). 
The plaintiff walked east to Beck Street, to point "D," 
then North on Beck Street to Point "E" as shown on 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, a general reproduction of which is 
found in the back of this brief and is marked Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1, along the west side of Beck Street until she was 
directly across from the driveway leading into the Mars 
Service Station (T. 30, L. 22-30). At the time a portion of 
Second West and a portion of Beck Street were under 
construction, but that portion of Beck Street shown in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, had received the first coat of black 
top (T. 19, L. 3-13). As is shown on the plat in the back 
of this brief and marked "PLAT" which is an enlargement 
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of a portion of Exhibit 1, encompassing the crossing and 
impact area, at the point of the accident and both to the 
north and the south there is a six lane highway, three lan'es 
for north bound traffic, three lanes for south bound traffic, 
\Vith a painted island in the center (T. 60, L. 18-29); the so 
called "island" was not raised, but was outlined with paint. 
The nearest crosswalk was one south of Wall Street and 
Beck Street intersection (T. 17, L. 14-23). There were no 
cross walks north to Covey's Service Station which is north 
of Victory Road and Beck Street intersection (T. 17, L. 
27-29). Victory Road and Wall Street intersection is shown 
on the map, plaintiff's Exhibit 1, which embraces a dis-
tance of 3000 feet. 
The plaintiff was standing at Point "E" which is di-
rectly across the street from point "A" as shown on Exhibit 
1, point "A" being the middle of the south driveway of 
the Mars Service Station (T. 35, L. 10-23). Plaintiff had 
looked to the north for traffic from the Ogden area and 
there wasn't any traffic. South of the plaintiff by the swim-
ming pool there were two pairs of car lights which the 
plaintiff saw and they were going at a slow speed. (T. 31, 
L. 13-17). The north corner of the area of the swimming 
pool is marked as point "C" on Exhibit 1 (T. 23, L.20-25). 
It is 1290 feet from point "A," the point directly across the 
street from where plaintiff was standing, to point "C," the 
cars, headlights being farther away than point "C." (T. 24, 
L. 16-17). The speed of the two cars just south of point 
"C," a distance in excess of 1290 feet from the plaintiff was 
20 mph (T. 33, L. 29). There were construction zone speed 
limit signs posted setting the speed at 25 mph (T. 15, L. 
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4-8, L. 20-30; T. 16, L. 2-24; T. 19, L. 23-28; T. 34, L. 12-16; 
T. 55, L. 3-5). In her testimony plaintiff further stated 
that these cars were almost two blocks away (T. 32, L. 23), 
and the attorney for the defendant stipulated Salt Lake 
City blocks are 660 feet long (T. 34, L. 4-11). After check-
ing the traffic and determining that there was no traffic 
to the north toward Ogden and that there were only the 
two cars at point "C," two blocks away to the south, the 
plaintiff started to cross the street (T. 35, L. 2-9). The 
plaintiff had decided there was no problem, no danger to 
herself (T. 35, L. 27-30; T. 61, L. 10). 
The next thing plaintiff remembered was that she was 
lying in the middle of the street with somebody holding 
her head (T. 35, L. 30; T. 36, L. 1) asking who her doctor 
was. Plaintiff could not remember the name of her doctor 
and gave them the name of her dentist and upon being told 
she didn't need a dentist she said to her questioner to call 
West Coast Air Lines and she remembered nothing further 
until she was in the emergency room (T. 36, L. 18-24). The 
plaintiff had been hit by a car driven by the defendant 
Butters who, in the emergency room in the hospital, ad-
mitted he had hit her (T. 36, L. 25-30; T. 37, L. 2-9). Again, 
several days later in plaintiff's room at the hospital the 
defendant Butters, who plaintiff did not remember seeing 
in the emergency room, admitted he had hit her (T. 37, L. 
11-30; T. 38, L. 3-11). In this conversation in plaintiff's hos-
pital room the defendant stated to the plaintiff, with rela-
tion as to where plaintiff was on the street at the time he 
hit her that "two more steps and she would have been 
on the curb." (T. 38, L. 18-22). 
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Witness Jewell was present both times defendant But-
ters appeared at the hospital, and testified that Butters said 
"two or three more steps and she would have been off the 
road" (T. 99, L. 16-17). Defendant Butters never saw the 
plaintiff until her body hit his windshield (T. 38, L. 15-16). 
Plaintiff does not remember the impact (T. 62, L. 11); 
she does not remember looking to the north again as she 
v\ras crossing the street (T. 61, L. 22-24; T. 62, L. 4 & 5), and 
has no recollection of not looking again to the south (T. 
62, L. 6-8). Plaintiff could not explain why her recollection 
was not good in connection with her looking (T. 63, L. 4-7). 
The last time plaintiff can swear she had looked to the 
south is when she was on the west side of the road. She 
may have looked afterwards; she may not have (T. 65, L. 
4-8). She cannot recall whether she did or did not look 
(T. 65, L. 13-19). Plaintiff was almost across the street and 
it was a shock to her to wake up and find that she was 
any place but across the street (T. 36, L. 6-7). 
Prior to the accident the plaintiff was in very good 
health (T. 57, L. 8-10). She received very serious injuries in 
the accident (T. 38, L. 26-30; T. 39, L. 2-9, L. 14-23; T. 71, 
L. 3-4; T. 72, L. 2-21, L. 25-26). 
In talking with her doctor the plaintiff was unable to 
recall the actual event of the accident (T. 73, L. 9-13). The 
lapse of memory may continue for a long period of time, 
but usually does not (T. 74, L. 9-15). 
At the conclusion of the first day's trial and after the 
Court had recessed and excused the jury until "10:00 
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o'clock tomorrow morning" (T. 100, L. 3-4), there was a 
discussion between counsel and Court in the Court's cham-
bers, in which defendant's counsel stated that he under-
stood that plaintiff's counsel intended to produce a wit-
ness who, based upon certain physical evidence or other 
evidence, would testify that the speed of the defendant's 
automobile at the time of impast was 45 mph, to which 
plaintiff's counsel replied that this was true and this was 
all of plaintiff's evidence (T. 100, L. 9-19). 
Based upon this, defendant's counsel moved "that the 
Court dismiss the plaintiff's cause of action on the grounds 
that the plaintiff's own evidence shows her to be guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and that her 
own contributory negligence, failing to keep track of the 
defendant's automobile, which she admits she saw prior to 
the time of her crossing the street, was a proximate cause 
of her OWll! injury and damage" (T. 100, L. 20-27). Defend-
ant's counsel stated there was only one question, "Did she 
have the duty to look again and it is clear in this case she 
didn't look" (T. 101, L. 5-7), to which the Court replied, 
''\\"ell, I think so, and the duty to look again is answered 
in this case down here at 33rd South and Second West. I 
Just do not see how you can avoid the consequences of 
this" (T. 101, L. 8-11), and in granting the motion the 
Court stated, " ... this motion is purely upon the contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff as a matter of law." ... 
"The motion will be granted" (T. 101, L. 18-21). 
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POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL 
1. That the evidence does not support the Court's con-
clusion that all reasonable minds must agree that plaintiff 
\Vas contributorily negligent. 
2. That the evidences does not support the conclusion 
of the Court that all reasonable minds must agree that the 
plaintiff' contributory negligence was a proximate cause of 
the collision. 
ARGUMENT 
Although there are two points of Appeal, the evidence 
and general law tend to apply to both, and for convenience 
and to avoid repetition they will not be set out in separate 
argument. 
The evidence and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff, Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 
P. 2 d 1047, Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 2d, 495, 
and Langlois v. Rees, 10 Utah 2d 272, 274, 351 P.2d. 638. 
The plaintiff was not in the crosswalk, either one that 
was painted or one designated by section 41-6-8 (b) U.C.A., 
1953. As is shown on plaintiff's exhibit 1, there is one and 
perhaps more T intersections. However, in the absence 
of a marked crosswalk, there is no crosswalk created by 
the Statute as is clearly set out in the Langlois v. Rees 
case, supra. 
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As is set forth in the record, the Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City provide that a pedestrian may not cross other 
than in a crosswalk unless there is no crosswalk within 
700 feet of desired point of crossing, and in such event the 
pedestrian may cross a highway by the shortest straight 
route to the opposite curb after exercising due care and 
<'aution and yielding to all vehicular traffic. The nearest 
crosswalk from the point which the plaintiff crossed the 
street is far in excess of 1200 feet. 
Viewing the evidence in its most favorable light to 
the plaintiff, the point of impact was 4 to 5 feet west of 
the curb line at the Mars Service Station on the east side 
of Beck Street and which point is marked "I" on the Plat. 
The plaintiff, a woman, was in high heels and walking 
and was within 2 steps of the curb or driveway, and would 
be taking steps of approximately 2 feet per step. She had 
traveled east almost 100 feet, having crossed 3 lanes of 
southbound traffic, a painted island, 2 traffic lanes and al-
most the third traffic lane for north bound traffic on the 
east side. As is shown on the Plat, the outside lane is a p-
proximately 22 feet wide, almost double the size of the 
middle lone or the inside lane. The defendant had approxi-
mately 40 feet of unused highway to his left, including 18 
feet within his own lane of traffic, but he chose to skim 
along the edge of the road, next to the gutter on that por-
tion which is not normally used particularly, while travel-
ling at 45 miles per hour, or he changed lanes or his prior 
position in the outside lanP which was almost double the 
average size, perhaps for the purpose of turning into the 
~Jars Gas Station. In either event, the defendant n·ever 
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saw plaintiff until her body hit his windshielf. In view of 
the distance travelled by the plaintiff whether it be total 
distance or even the distance of approximately 40 feet 
over the north bound traffic lan'e and her nearness to the 
curb line or driveway, it cannot be concluded that the 
plaintiff, as a matter of law, is guilty of contributory negli-
gence, and further that her contributory negligence, as-
suming the same, was a proximate cause of the accident. 
Quite to the contrary, reasonable men could differ upon 
the interpretation of the facts herein, and a jury might 
well find that the defendant's automobile was not "so 
near as to constitute an immediate hazard" and that the 
plaintiff did use the ordinary care that a reasonably pru-
dent person, in a like position would have used in keeping 
with Section 20.8 of JURY INSTRUCTION FORMS FOR 
UTAH, citing Section 41-6-78, U.C.A. 1953, and Sant v. 
Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 P.2d 719. Conceding for the sake 
of argument that this Court upholds the lower Court in 
holding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence, it does not follow automatically that her negligence 
was a proximate cause of the accident. Reasonable minds 
might differ and a jury might well find from the facts of 
this case and the presumptions hereinafter set forth that 
the assummed negligence of the plaintiff was not a proxi-
mate cause. 
It would appear from the statements made by the 
Court in granting defendant's motion to dismiss that the 
Court agreed with the statement made by defense 
counsel: 
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"MR. HANSON: The only question is-did she have 
the duty to look again, and it is clear in this case that she 
didn't look." 
"THE COURT: Well, I think so, and the duty to look 
again is answered in this case down here at 33rd South 
and Second West. I just don't see how you can avoid the 
consequences of this. I guess there is no reason not to 
,rrant it now and call the jury." (T. 101, L. 5-12). ~ 
We submit that the record does not bear out the state-
ment of defendant's counsel when he says, "it is clear in 
this case that she didn't look." The record uncontradictor-
ily reveals that when plaintiff was on the west side of 
Second Avenue West or Beck Street directly across the 
street from the entrance to the Mars Service Station sh~ 
looked north to see if traffic was coming from Ogden, as 
\veil as south (T. 31, L. 9-17; T. 35, L. 2-24; T. 59, L. 5-16; 
T. 63. L. 23-24). There was no traffic coming from the 
north and two cars coming from the south and these two 
cars were approximately two blocks away going at a speed 
of 20 mph (T. 32, L. 22-30). The record shows that it was 
over 1290 feet from plaintiff's position to the point where 
the cars were (T. 24, L. 16-17). Plaintiff decided there was 
no problem at all, there was no danger to herself (T. 35, 
L. 29-20), and started to cross the street. The last thing 
plaintiff remembers is she was just plain walking (T. 61, 
L. 10) and then the next thing she remembers was that 
she was in the middle of the street with someoody holding 
her head and asking who her doctor was (T. 35, L. 30; T. 
36, L. 2, L. 19-20). Plaintiff could not even remember the 
name of her doctor (T. 36, L. 20-21). 
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Both on direct and on cross-examination plaintiff tes-
tified repeatedly that she could not remember anything 
after she had started to cross the street, or what she did 
or did not do after she left the west side of the street ( T. 
61, L. 16-17, L. 24; T. 62, L. 4-5; L. 8, L. 11, L. 29-30; T. 
63, L. 2-7, L. 16, L. 23-26; T. 65, L. 4-8, L. 16-19; T. 92, L. 
12). The plaintiff was struck by the defendant (T. 37, L. 
8-10), but has no recollection whatever of the impact (T. 
62, L. 11). When Dr. Morrow talked with the plaintiff she 
was unable to remember the actual event of the accident 
(T. 73, L. 9-13). The plaintiff received very severe and 
substantial injuries (T. 38, L. 26-30; T. 39, L. 2-9, L. 14-23; 
T. 71, L. 3-4; T. 72, L. 2-21, L. 25-26). 
It is abundantly clear and absolutely uncontradicted 
that the plaintiff has no recollection of what she did and 
as to whether or not she looked again to see where the 
cars to her south were after she left the west sides of the 
highway. Plaintiff's contention is that she had a lapse of 
memory. This is supported by the testimony of Dr. Morrow. 
In fact, Dr. Morrow testified that this lapse of memory 
't L . J.,) awr~ JO pOJJad 8UOI B JOJ anur~uoo .Aew JO lSJXa ueJ 
L. 9-15). Dr. Morrow's testimony, we believe, is clear that 
because of the severe nature of the injuries there can be 
a lapse of time when the plaintiff will not remember what 
she did or what happened. Therefore, we must accept the 
plaintiff's testimony that she could not remember and con-
clude that she did suffer a lapse of memory for a matter 
of seconds immediately prior to the accident. 
A lapse of memory during which the events that took 
place still cannot be recalled to her mind is a question of 
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fact for the triers of the facts, it is a jury question. Napoli 
t. Hunt. 297 P.2d 653; Kumlauskes v. Cozzi, Cal., 343 P.2d 
6Df>: Schalow v. Oakley, Wash., 139, P2d 296. Since this is 
n jury question, the Court was not permitted to conclude 
as a matter of law that the testimony of the plaintiff was 
not true, but on the other hand, the Court must accept that 
testimony as being true. Since we must then accept this 
testimony as being true, we must then proceed with the 
law and the presumptions that are raised by the law. We 
respectfully submit to this Court that logically there is 
utterly no difference in the following hypothetical state-
tnent: A person is involved in an accident and is killed. 
The law presumes that person exercised due care and 
caution, the presumption being based upon the instinct of 
self-preservation and arises in the absence of other wit-
nesses or evidence. A person crosses a highway, is struck 
by a car and has no recollection! of the events between the 
time they started to cross the highway and when they were 
struck. For all intents and purposes as to what happened 
in that short interval, that person may as well have been 
dead. The law of self-preservation is a law exercised by 
c. living person and it makes no difference whether the 
person was killed or severely injured in the subsequent 
mishap, the law is just as strong. It is completely illogical 
that a person would walk into the path of a rapidly moving 
automobile anticipating that they would only be injured, 
not killed, and that they would lose their memory. We, 
therefore, submit there is no logical reason why the pre-
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sumption which arises when a person is killed does not 
also arise when a person's memory fails. 
VIe respectfully submit that the presumption does 
arise and that the plaintiff is afforded all the benefits based 
on the instinct of self-preservation that a deceased or a 
person from a loss of memory as in this case, was. exercis-
ing due care for her own safety and which may take the 
place of evidence sufficient to make for positive findings in 
favor of the plaintiff in absence of the preponderance of 
the evidence to the contrary. Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. 
and Dep. Co., 120 Utah 453, 235 P.2d515, Mecham v. Al-
len, 1 Utah 2d 29, 262 Pac. 2d 285, Tuttle v. P.I.E. 121 Utah 
420, 242 Pac., 2d 764. The mere fact that the plaintiff was 
hit in the highway in no way rebuts that presumption. 
That presumption can only be rebutted by the preponder-
ance of the evidence to the contrary. The foregoing is rec-
ognized in Section 16.8 of JURY INSTRUCTION FORMS 
F'OR UTAH. 
Therefore, plaintiff contends that when she left the 
west side of the highway she had ample time to safely 
cr.oss the highway prior to the arrival of the car being 
driven by the defendant, which car was at least 1290 feet 
away when first observed, drivin1g at an estimated speed 
of 20 miles per hour. The plaintiff had an absolute right to 
rely upon the fact that the defendant would comply with 
the posted speed limit which was 25 miles per hour (T. 
15, L. 4-8, L. 20-30; T. 16 L. 2-24), and that the defendant 
-vvould not speed up or otherwise recklessly drive into the 
plaintiff. Section 41-6-79(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Fox v. Taylor 10 Utah 2d, 174, 350 Pac. 2d, 154. 
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Since the duty and care imposed upon the plaintiff is 
to look and continue to look in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, it is presumed that the plaintiff discharged 
that duty . .Nlingos vs. Olson, supra. We further submit that 
the factual situation in this case as afforded by this record 
as to the events after the plaintiff left the west side of the 
highway and up to the time of impact, is almost a perfect 
example to apply the reasoning of the Honorable Justice 
\Varle in the case of Mingus vs. Olsson, supra: 
"If there were a complete absence of evidence as 
to whether he took any precautions to avoid the 
accident, then the law creates a presumption that 
he took reasonable precautions for his own safety 
and that he was injured in spite of such pre-
tions.'' 
In upholding the defendant's Motion the Court had to 
find, from the facts, that reasonable men could draw but 
one inference and that inference would point unerringly 
(emphasis is added) to the plaintiff's negligence which con-
tributed to her inqury. Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 2d 272, 
254 P.2d 1047. It is clear from the evidence that there is 
n1ore than one inference that can be drawn from facts and 
such inferences would not point unerringly to the plain-
tiff's negligence which contributed to her injury. It was 
agreed that defendant's automobile was travelling 45 miles 
per hour at the time of the impact. (T. 100 L. 11-16). The 
only way, as we see it, that this inference could not be 
construed to be beneficial to the plaintiff, and even then 
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it is doubtful whether such construction would not be 
beneficial to the plaintiff, is by assuming that there was a 
gradual increase of speed by the defendant over a distance 
in excess of 1290 feet. The Court is not at liberty to con-
strue this inference against the plaintiff, but to the con-
trary must construe in favor of the plaintiff. Therefore, the 
con1struction must be that the defendant's increase of speed 
must have been sudden and immediate before the impact. 
The plaintiff having once entered the street was entitled 
to rely upon the fact that the defendant would not sudden-
ly increase his seed in violation of the Statute, and further 
the plaintiff was entitled to the presumption that a person 
who is exercising due care has a right to rely and assume 
that others will also perform their duties under the law, 
i.e. that the defendant would not speed up, and that the 
defendant would not exceed the speed limit. Ferguson v. 
R.eynolds, 52 Utah 583, 176 Pac. 267. 
We not only strongly disagree with counsel for de-
fendant's statement when he stated, " ... did she have the 
duty to look again and it is clear in this case that she didn't 
look," but we contend that every shred of the evidence con-
tained in this record where there is positive testimony as 
to what happened is that the plaintiff was without negli-
gence. Plaintiff was not trying to beat them across the 
Street (T. 59, L. 19). Having looked, determined defen-
dant's distance, defendant's rate of travel, plaintiff conclud-
ed that she was absolutely safe instartingacrossthatstreet. 
Not remembering whether or not she looked after leaving 
the west side of the street, having been rendered uncon-
scious, the plaintiff is entitled to the presumption of the 
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law. that she did look, that she discharged the duty of 
tTa~onable care and the further presumption that she was 
injured in spite of such precautions. 
We believe that the lower Court was relying on Smith 
vs. Bennett, 1 Utah 2d 224, 265 P.2d 401. The facts in that 
case are far different and easily distinguishable from the 
facts of this case. There the pedestrian left a marked cross-
walk in the middle of the road, walked up the middle of 
the street, and there was evidence that she suddenly ran' 
from a place of safety in front of the defendant's auto-
mobile. She rather obviously had mislead the defendant 
by turning her back to him and moving away from him 
in a safety zone. None of these facts are presenrt in the case 
before you. The Smith case is in keeping with the Lang-
lois case; in each case there was an available marked cross-
\valk. 
There was neither a marked crosswalk nor an un-
marked crosswalk anywhere near the vicinity for Mrs. 
Evans to use. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We respectfully submit that the lower Court erred iDJ 
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and that judgment 
should be reversed and the cast remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BELL&BELL 
by J. RICHARD BELL, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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